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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SUSAN H. EARLY,
Respondent/Plaintiff

CASE NO. 890306-CA

v.
DAVID W. EARLY, .,

BRIEF Oi" APPELLANT

Anpo 1 ! ,\nf- /Defendant
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An "Order and Judgment" was signed and entered by the
court on April 17, 1989, the honorable Richard H. Moffat presiding
(R.930) wherein the respondent was awarded most of the relief
requested by her and the appellant's requested relief was denied.
A "Notice of Appeal" was filed by the appellant on May 12,
1989.

This is an appeal from the Order and Judgment entered by

the court on April 17, 1989.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW:
(1) Is the appellant responsible for property taxes on the
home awarded to the respondent, Susan Early, which taxes were
incurred after the entry of the Decree of Divorce?
(2) Is the appellant entitled to a judgment, as well as
an offset

against amounts he owes respondent, for bills he paid

which which had been incurred by Mrs. Early, which she had been
ordered to pay pursuant to the Decree of Divorce?
(3) Was the District Court in error in refusing to enter,
as a minimum, a brief written statement setting forth the grounds
for its decision as required in Rule 52(a)?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES:
RULE 52(a), U.R.C.P.:

(Pertinent part only)

"The trial court need not enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided
in Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief
written statement of the ground for its decision on all
motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and ( b ) , 56 . . . ."
59-2-1325, U.C.A.

(1953 as amended):

(Pertinent part only)

"Ai_ -ixes, u.i -is '^t.iorwise specifically provided for
under Sec. 59-2- L 326, or other law, unpaid at noon on
November 30 c£ cich year following the date of levy, are
delinquent, and the county treasurer shall close his office
for the receipt of taxes until a delinquent list for
publication has oeen prepared.
If November 30 falls on
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at noon on the aay following the Sunday or legal holiday."
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recommendation upon several grounds (R.321), including

requests

for a receiver, an accounting of rents, greater alimony, greater
child support, and fees for attorneys and appraisers.

This

objection was heard by the court in May of 1987, and on June 24,
1987, the District Court entered a "Minute Entry", signed by Judge
Moffat, wherein most of the relief recommended by the Commissioner
was affirmed, with some exceptions which are not pertinent to the
issues of this appeal.

(See Addendum B)

(R.398)

By means of

these two rulings, the court governed the payment of debts
associated with the family residence during the pendency of the
proceedings.
5. The portion of the Commissioner's recommendation that
was affirmed which is germane to this appeal is "that defendant
maintain the mortgage, tax, and insurance payments on the parties1
home during the pendency of this action." (R.319)
6. The case ultimately came on for trial on August 8,9,10
and 11, 1988, the honorable Richard H. Moffat presiding, and a
subsequent hearing on October 20, 1988.
7. Subsequent to the time of trial, and prior to a ruling
by the court on the issues, the parties entered into a Stipulation
and Property Settlement Agreement, dated October 13, 1988, wherein
all issues between the parties were resolved. (R.789) (See Addendum
C)
8. On October 20, 1988, a default hearing was held by the
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court, wherein testimony was taken as to grounds and jurisdiction,
and the Stipulation of the parties was approved.
9. Subsequently, and prior to the entry of the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law (R.785), and the Decree of Divorce (R.77
a Mutual Release was signed by the parties, dated October 26, 1988.
(R.802)

This release was referred to in the Findings of Fact and

was incorporated therein by interlineation by the parties. (R.786)
(See Addendum D)
10. The Decree of Divorce (R.776) was entered by the
court on October 28, 1988.
11. On or about December 9, 1988, after other related
correspondence, counsel for respondent submitted a letter to
appellant's counsel outlining a claim to various sums of money.
(R.906,909)
12. No agreement or settlement being reached, the
respondent, Susan Early, then filed a motion, dated February 7,
1989, and styled Motion for Order of Contempt and Judgment and
Supporting Memorandum (R.875), wherein she claimed that the
appellant had not paid her certain amounts due under the Decree
of Divorce, that he be found in contempt and that a judgment be
entered against him for the amounts due.

This motion was supported

by an affidavit signed by the respondent. (R.863) (See Addendum E)
13.

The appellant, David Early, responded with an

objection and his own motion for counter-relief under a motion
styled Objection and Motion for Judgment and Supporting Memorandum,
dated February 28, 1989. (R.905)

As with the respondent's motion,
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Mr. Early's objection and motion was supported by an accompanying
affidavit. (R.909) (See Addendum F)
14. Mrs. Early, the respondent, made demand for reimbursement
of bills owing to Utah Power & Light, Mountain Fuel, U.S. West,
expenses for the Audi automobile and taxes on the home awarded to
her, all prorated through October 27, 1988 (the date of the signing
of the Decree of Divorce).

This demand was made by virtue of the

recommendation of the Commissioner, as well as the order of Judge
Moffat.

It was conceded by the appellant below that the debts

for the utilities and the prorated support and alimony for the
month of October, 1988, were proper expenses and agreed to pay
same.

However, the appellant disputed the claim for the taxes

on the home awarded to the respondent for reasons more fully set
forth in our argument below.

He also made demand for reimbursement

of monies paid on bills incurred by Mrs. Early after the date of
separation.
15. A "Request for Ruling" was filed by Mrs. Early. (R.922)
16. After considering the memoranda of the parties the court
responded with a "Minute Entry" opinion granting a money judgment
to Mrs. Early (R.919), and subsequently the court signed an "Order
and Judgment" dated April 17, 1989. (R.925)

The motion for

contempt was denied by the court in an Amended Minute Entry.(R.923)
17. As part of its ruling the court entered judgment not only
for the amounts Mr. Early admitted were due Mrs. Early, but also
entered judgment for the prorated amount due for taxes on the
family residence which had been awarded to Mrs. Early.

The court
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also denied Mr. Early's request for an offset and for a judgment
for amounts he had claimed and had more fully set forth in his
supporting affidavit.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS:
(A) REAL PROPERTY TAXES: Commissioner Peuler recommended
that Mr. Early " . . .

maintain the mortgage, tax, and insurance

payments on the parties 1 home during the pendency of this action
. . . . " (R.319)

Prior to and during the pendency of the

proceedings the home was subject to a general mortgage lien which
covered various assets of the parties.

The appellant, Mr. Early,

paid all obligations required under that mortgage obligation.
Said mortgage did not require an impound for taxes and insurance,
and therefore, no such items became due and payable as a condition
of maintaining the mortgage.

The taxes on the residence did not

become due until November 30, 1988, per 59-2-1325, U.C.A., more
than a month after the entry of the Decree of Divorce.

Appellant

should not have been made to pay such taxes.
(B) AMOUNTS OWING TO APPELLANT WHICH WERE DENIED:
12 of the Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement

Paragraph
(R.796)

provides, in part, that "the plaintiff agrees to assume and pay
all separate debts and liabilities which she has incurred subsequent to the separation of the parties . . . ."

The Decree of

Divorce also provides that she will pay said debts.

Mrs. Early

incurred a substantial number of bills after the separation date whi
Mr. Early had to pay, and for which Mr. Early demanded a setoff
and reimbursement.

The court refused this request despite the
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clear language of the Decree and the Stipulation providing
that she was to pay such debts.

This was in error.

(C) WRITTEN BASIS FOR RULING:

The District Court failed to

set forth any written basis for its ruling.

The District Court

should have issued a brief written statement setting forth the
basis for its ruling per Rule 52(a)', U.R.C.P.

The parties are

entitled to know the basis for the court's ruling.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:
THE DISTRICT COURT ERREDIN AWARDING THE RESPONDENT A
JUDGMENT AGAINST THE APPELLANT FOR A PRO RATED SHARE OF
THE REAL PROPERTY TAXES ON THE HOME AWARDED TO THE
RESPONDENT BY THE DECREE OF DIVORCE
During the course of the proceedings, early on in the
action between the parties, Mrs. Early brought on for hearing an
Order to Show Cause wherein she sought various forms of relief,
including a question of who should pay certain debts of the
parties.

As part of the recommendation issued by Commissioner

Sandra Peuler the court recommended that " . . . defendant maintain
the mortgage, tax, and insurance payments on the parties' home
during the pendency of this action f M (R.319) Judge Moffat, in a
subsequent hearing on Mrs. Early's rejection of the Commissioner's
recommendation, affirmed this part of the recommendation. (R.398)
After the Decree of Divorce was entered in October of 1988,
Mrs. Early initiated a proceeding in February of 1989 wherein
she sought a judgment against the appellant for certain sums of
money she claimed were owed to her. (R.875)

This motion was
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supported by Mrs, Earlyfs affidavit. (R.863)

She claimed that

since the court had ordered him to pay all tax payments on the
property during the pendency of the proceedings Mr. Early was
obligated to pay a pro rata share to the date of the Decree of
Divorce in October of 1988.

With this Mr. Early disagrees.

In Mr. Early's response, including his affidavit (R.906,
910), he makes it clear that there were no monthly house payments
on the home of the parties per se, but rather, the home and other
property owned by the Earlys was security for a separate loan
obligation.

This separate debt required no impound for taxes

and insurance, nor were there any separate payments for taxes and
insurance during the pendency of the proceedings. (R.910)

The

only obligation was the monthly payment on the overall obligation
secured by the home and the other property.

These monthly

payments were made by Mr. Early as they became due (R.906), and
as a result Mr. Early fulfilled the requirements of the order of
the court by paying the designated debts of the parties as they
became due during the course of the proceedings.

No tax debt

existed during this time, and thus he did all he was required to do.
No monthly impound was made for tax and insurance purposes
during the course of the year, with no tax liability arising for
the home until noon on November 30th, 19 88, when the real property
taxes became due.

59-2-1325, U.C.A. (1953 as amended), provides

in part as follows:
"All taxes, unless otherwise specifically provided for under
Sec. 59-2-1326, or other law, unpaid at noon on November
30 of each year following the date of levy, are delinquent,
and the county treasurer shall close his office for the
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receipt of taxes until a delinquent list for publication has
been prepared. If November 30 falls on a Sunday or other
legal holiday, taxes become delinquent at noon on the day
following the Sunday or legal holiday."
The Decree of Divorce was entered on October 28, 1988.
(R.776)

The taxes were due by November 30th.

The appellant did

pay during the pendency of the proceedings, prior to the entry of
the Decree, all obligations on the mortgage connected with the
home.

Therefore the appellant did comply fully with the court's

order as to the debts on the home which he was required to pay.
The fact that a tax debt accrues and becomes due after the divorce,
covering taxes for a period of time prior to the divorce, does not
mean that appellant did not comply fully with the court's order.
Since there was no tax liability during the course of the proceeding£
he could not have been held in contempt for failing to pay taxes
during that time.

Therefore, how can he be required to pay for

a debt after his obligation to pay for such a debt has ceased?
It is abundantly obvious that it was the court's intent
in the initial proceedings covering the payment of the debts on
the home, that appellant, Mr. Early, pay certain debts during the
pendency of the divorce proceedings in order to protect and support
his family.

The court intended that as part of that support he

pay certain debts on the home as they accrued in order to ease
the burdens upon the family.
towards taxes.
he paid.
not owing.

There were no monthly payments

There were monthly payments on th€> mortgage, which

The court did not intend that he pay debts that were
The tax debt was not owing until after the divorce.

At that time the tax obligation became the sole responsibility of
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Mrs. Early.

We therefore submit that it was error for the court

to order Mr. Early to pay for a debt that did not exist during
the pendency of the proceedings.

The tax debt did not exist until

after the entry of the Decree, at a time when the parties were
governed by the Decree of Divorce.

The parties and the court were

no longer governed by prior orders that had been intended to deal
with matters on a temporary basis only.
Next, we draw the court's attention to the Mutual Release
signed by the parties and dated October 26, 1988.
this release are broad and all encompassing.

The terms of

The pertinent parts

are as follows:
Page 1 (R.802)
"Now, therefore, in consideration of the premies aforesaid,
and subject to the faithful performance of the requirements
of said judgment and decree based upon such Stipulation,
the said parties, and each of them, do hereby release and
forever discharge the other of, from, and against any and all
claims,demands, causes of action, obligations, damages, and
liabilities of any nature whatsoever, whether known or
unknown, suspected or claimed, which they, and each of them,
ever had, now have, or may hereafter have or claim to have
against the other, whether known or unknown, including specifically, but not exclusively, and without limiting the
generality of the foregoing, any and all claims and causes
of action, based on, or in any manner arising out of the
marriage relationship of the parties, or any other relationship, existing prior hereto, or in any manner connected
therewith. * * * * [P. 3, R.804] The parties shall, and
do, hereby mutually temise, release, and forever discharge
each other, the attorney's, accountant, appraisers, and all
other professionals employed in this divorce action from
any and all actions, suits, debts, claims, demands, and
obligations whatsoever, whether based upon law, equity, or
fraud, which either of them has ever had, now has, or may
hereafter have, against any of the others, upon or by reason
of any matter, cause, or thing up to the date of the
execution of the Stipulation for divorce settlement and the
execution of this Mutual Release, including, but not limited
to, omissions, comissions, breach of contract, tort, negligent
misrepresentation, fraudulent representation, breach of
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trust or fiduciary duty, or any other matter founded upon
equitable relief. * * * * [P.4, R.805] It is the intention
of the parties that hence forth there shall be as between
them only such explicit rights and obligations as are
specifically provided in the Stipulation and Property
Settlement Agreement hereinabove identified and the judgment
which issues pursuant thereto."
Two conclusions can be drawn from this release.

The first,

and the one most favorable to the respondent, is that the release
releases all claims between the parties.

So, Mrs. Early would

have no claim against Mr. Early for taxes and Mr. Early would have
no claim against her for amounts he claims due him after the parties
separated.

In Mrs. Early's responsive memorandum below (R.916) she

states that Mr. Early's claim that he was obligated only to make
the payments necessary to protect the property during the pendency
of the proceedings was "farcical."

However, the real argument that

is farcical is that they claim moneis due in the face of a very
general and broad release.
Mrs. Early argued below (R. 915-916) that the Stipulation
between the parties required Mr. Early to pay the taxes on the
home.

The Stipulation doesn't provide that at all, and the Mutual

Release would clearly seem to indicate that both parties have
performed fully those obligations required of them.
The second interpretation is that the Mutual Release
absolves Mr. Early of any claim on the taxes, but does not absolve
Mrs. Early of the offsets claimed because the Release provides
that the parties will continue to be bound only to do those things
they are obligated to do in the Stipulation, and the Stipulation doe;
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not provide that he pay any taxes, but only provides that Mrs.
Early pay debts incurred by her after the separation date.
assert that this interpretation is the correct one.

We

Even if we

assume for argument's sake that he owed taxes from a prior order,
it is clear that the Release releases him from all prior obligations
under any orders prior to the final Decree and obligates him only
to do those things set forth in the Stipulation and the resulting
Decree of Divorce.

It simply does not require that he perform

acts under prior court orders.

The prior orders were to govern

matters until the Decree was entered, and the Decree was intended
to supplant the prior orders.

This is all hypothetical only

since it is our position that the prior order in any event did
not require Mr. Early to pay any taxes if no tax debt existed
during the pendency of the proceedings.
Mrs. Early below argued that the release protects her, but
not Mr. Early. (R.915)

This makes no sense.

Since the Release

specifically provides on page 4 (R.805) that the parties will
be bound to do only those things set forth in the Stipulation and
subsequent Decree, Mr. Early has no obligation to pay taxes because
nothing about a tax obligation for the residence is mentioned
in either document.

On the other hand

it is mentioned in the

Decree that Mrs. Early will pay for debts incurred by her after
the date of separation.
Accordingly, we submit that the court

erred

below in

ignoring the clear language of the Release and Stipulation, and
ordering Mr. Early to pay a tax obligation that did not exist
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until after the entry of the Decree of Divorce.
POINT II:
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO AWARD APPELLANT A JUDGMENT
AND OFFSET FOR AMOUNTS CLAIMED DUE FROM RESPONDENT
In appellant's Affidavit (R.909) he admits that there are
some monies owing to Mrs. Early from the last month prior to the
entry of the Decree.

However, he also specifies in his affidavit

various bills that he had been required to pay that had been
incurred by Mrs. Early after the date of separation.

The Decree

of Divorce (R.782) and the Stipulation (R.887) both clearly provide
that Mrs. Early will pay for debts incurred after the date of
separation.

The debts claimed by Mr. Early were incurred after

the date of separation, and this fact, together with the fact
that the amounts were paid by Mr. Early, were unrefuted.

This

being the case there can be no defense to Mr. Early's claims.
The only argument the respondent advanced below was that
the Mutual Release absolved her of any responsibility.

She takes

the odd position that the Stipulation and Release both " . . .

were

designed with the intent of releasing Plaintiff from all claims
or expenses incurred subsequent to the separation and preserving
only Plaintiff's claims . . . ." (R.917)
didn't read the Release carefully.
Release".
alone.

Perhaps Mrs. Early

It states that it is a "Mutual

It does not state that it is a release of Mrs. Early

It is highly falacious to argue that it was intended to

release her from Mr. Early's claims, yet not release him from hers.
This is not a unilateral agreement or release, and there is absolute]
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nothing in the record to indicate that there was ever any intent
by the parties to provide such unilateral relief to Mrs. Early alone
Furthermore, the language on page 4 of that Release clearly
provides that the parties are to be bound by the obligations in
the Stipulation and accompanying Decree.

That Decree (R.782)

provides that Mrs. Early is to pay the debts incurred by her after
the date of separation.

Mrs. Early claims the best of both worlds—

no obligations on her part to Mr. Early, but he owing her everything
This is clearly contrary to the wording of the documents, as well
as the intent of the parties.
We therefore submit that Mr. Early was entitled to recover
a judgment against Mrs. Early for the amounts claimed due by him
in his affidavit.

The Mutual Release does absolve him of any

possible tax obligation, if one ever existed.
POINT III:
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ISSUE A WRITTEN STATEMENT
SETTING FORTH THE GROUNDS AND REASONS FOR ITS DECISION
Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P., provides in part as follows:
"The trial court need not enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as
provided in Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, issue
a brief written statement of the ground for its decision
on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b),
56 . . . ."
The appellant filed an objection to the court's ruling and
requested that the court either make and enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law (r.935), or in the alternative, that the court
make and issue some brief explanation setting forth the grounds
and rationale for its decision. (R.936)

This the court refused to d<
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(R.940)

While we concede that the court is not required to make

findings of fact and conclusions of law in a ruling on a summary
judgment motion, the court was obligated to issue a written
statement of the grounds for its ruling.

The decision

down by the court (R.925) fails to do this.

handed

Thus, the appellant

is left with absolutely no idea as to why the court has ruled
as it has, thus placing everyone involved in the dark as to the
rationale for the court's decision.
Furthermore, the court has avoided its responsibility to
justify to the parties the basis for its ruling.

The court should

be required to set forth in a statement the grounds and reasons
for its decision not only for the reason of adequately informing
the parties as to the basis for the ruling, but to maintain
adequate accountability of the court.

We therefore submit that

the court was in error in refusing to submit a brief written
statement setting forth the reasons for its ruling.
CONCLUSION
We submit that Mr. Early should not have had a judgment
entered against him for the taxes on the residential property
for the reasons that (a) the debt never existed during the pendency
of the proceedings and was not due until after the Decree of Divorce
was entered, and (b) the Mutual Release released him from any
possible tax obligation, and obligated him only to those things
set forth in the Decree of Divorce.

That Decree provides for no

requirement that he pay taxes on the residence.
the judgment for this amount should be reversed.

Accordingly,
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Mr. Early is entitled to an offset against the amounts
he admits owing Mrs. Early, and a judgment against her for the
balance of the monies he paid on debts incurred by her which
are her responsibility under the Decree and Stipulation.
The Mutual Release clearly does not provide that she be absolved
of this responsibility of reimbursement becasue the Release on
page 4 clearly provides that the parties are required to carry
out the obligations incumbent upon them under the terms of the
Stipulation and resulting Decree.

That Decree requires her to

pay these debts.
The court also erred in refusing to provide a written
statement setting forth the grounds for its ruling.

This places

the appellant at a disadvantage in attempting to respond to the
actions of the court and reduces the accountability of the court.
We therefore request that the judgment against Mr. Early
be reversed, and that a judgment against Mrs. Early for the
amounts due Mr. Early, after appropriate offsets, be granted in
favor of Mr. Early.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

BRANT H. WALL
Attorney for Appellant/Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that four copies of the appellant's
foregoing Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, to Richard D.
Burbidge, attorney for respondent/plaintiff, 139 East South
Temple, Suite 2001, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, on the 20th day
of October, 1989.

GREGORY B. WALL
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ADDENDUM "B"

MINUTE ENTRY

M 2 4 m?

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, °TATE OF UTAH

SUSAN EARLY,
Plaintiff,
. vs.

:

BftearSifOtf

/

:

CIVIL NO. D-86-4771

:

DAVID WARREN EARLY,
Defendant.

:

The Commissioner's Order is approved in its entirety, other
than as it is in conflict with the following.
Defendant is ordered to pay the utility bills on the home of
the parties.
All major repairs on the residence will be paid as agreed by
the parties, and in the event they cannot agree, as determined by
the Court or Commissioner upon application.
The defendant
advance

to

will

cause

plaintiff, the

Dapor,

sum

of

Inc.,

$5,000.00

or will

personally

per month

for six

consecutive months, and those funds shall be used by plaintiff
exclusively
auditing

and

for

tine

other

instant action.

purpose

necessary

They

shall

of

her

attorneys,

fees

for

the

not be used

without permission of the Court.

accounting,

prosecution

of the

for any other purpose

Said account will be set up as

a loan account from the corporation/- or from the defendant to the
plaintiff as the case may be, with final determination of the

EARLY V

PAGE TWO

PA1 tY

DECISION

obligation to repay to be made at the time of final disposition
of this action
Q.e^endcin.ts

lis teUTcsfelJfeo? o l d e n e d

member? a l t e r i n g

*Efi£

accounting

and

practices

B?M3£ <mSrin~eTt<> on msitKegS o'fi p a ^ ' e h J S o:f
mg,i5hud o^fl rei^ei\YdJin:g

accounts

restrained
of" t h e

a'ccojunts*}

rrecei! v vab]5e

so

from

in

any

businesses,

or

that

the
it

or

manner

will

or

become
ft

<tf<me d^frfil'QU^fe

to

defeeosmine

£ G » Shre dompany b^SWfre'ff^eis
SpreAi-f^fcalhbY

:

fl'ow.s^

aarrd t h e

and

tare

a_Qd tiSSi&ixa^iJn'ed

^aj^ta^es^
fieom

-fche

and

income

income r e c e i v e d

defendant

aUMte-jsing* t i r e

Ifeajfirg jfias&g f a s e'a.Qb SAP^entey,

expenses

i'hUlvl%u:ais.

#n rveUtafJ&on t o \tn*e r e n t a l

'$*&& gMo^enstgdie^' ojff
:efi#&€<ned

sash

is

amounts

and fesptt a l ^ r i n g ,

specifically
of

payments

or attending,

8g3$R$3&^ %$& 2&03&B4 yLZLWfmezifcs< a*& Hhes ;end> -ojfi thre y e a *
aitBSya^

^°^

sarfSi

^rroper;t$e's

a*s

s'e£

for.th

for

for

the

or

f-a»om

year

19 8 6

SflaSSftouS W e spjaj£Sd^*3 apgroViafl/. ojff t h e ' C o u r t ,
In
the

the

event

plaintiff's

refiled

Motion

before the

Dated t h i s

any d i f f i c u l t y
for

the

is

encountered

appointment

of

in t h i s

a receiver

regard,
may b e

Court.
_ d a y of J u n e ,

1987.

RICHARD II. MOFFAT
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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ADDENDUM "C"

STIPULATION AND PROPERTY
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

BRANT H. WALL, NO. 3 36 4
ij/ALL & WALL, a.p.c.
Attorney for Defendant
$uite 800 Boston Building
jSa.lt Lake City, Utah 84111
[telephone: (801) 521-8220

i!

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

n
!$USAN H. EARLY,
Plaintiff,

STIPULATION AND PROPERTY
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

I ;
II
i i

ii

Vi

Civil No. D86-4771
jOAVID W. EARLY,
HONORABLE RICHARD H. MOFFAT

ii
1

i!

Defendant,
COME

NOW

the

parties

to

the

above

entitled

Ij

individually,
ii

and

Stipulate

agree

Iqrants

and

by

their

that

in

a d e c r e e of d i v o r c e

.conditions

shall

be

resoective
the

event

in t h i s

incorporated

counsel
the

cause,

'therein

above

of

record,

entitled

and
Court

t h e f o l l o w in? t e r m s
and made a p a r t

of

and
said

j,

'judgment and decree:
;;

1.

The Defendant, David Early, shall pay to the Plaintiff,

jfiusan Marly, subject, however, to the conditions, 1 imitations, £;:d
jprovi.siori£

hereinafter

set forth

in this

Paragraph,, the sum of.

($1,250,000 as follows:
•j

A)

$1,000,000

in cash upon

receipt of some by v.hf:

;j

Defendant via the procurement of mortgage loan proceeds in

11

such amount which

* A U A A-Acl (A PC )

Ij

^ r ' ^ N t Y S A ! LAW

; I

available to the Plaintiff within a period of not more thnn

£ K O fiOifO. B'JiV.OtNG
. • i.*Af r.ir>t j i 041 j i

'j
';
!!

in any event shall be paid to and madf;
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5 days from and after the execution of this Stipulation.
Be it provided, however, that in the event such funds are
unavailable to the Defendant from such source or sources,
then, and in that event, this Agreement and Stipulation
shall be considered null and void and of no further force
and effect.
B)

$250,000 shall be paid to the Plaintiff by the

Defendant in the form of a Promissory Note, in the form of
Exhibit "A" hereto, bearing interest at a rate of 10% per
annum.

Such Note to be amortized and in equal monthly

installments for a period of five (5) years, and secured by
a First Deed of Trust, in the form of Exhibit. "B" hereto,
on

certain

real

property

generally

identified

as David'

Early Tire Store # 2, located at approximately 253 West
9000 South, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

Said Note and

Deed of Trust shall be executed and delivered concurrent
with the payment of the $1,000,000, aforesaid.
2.
^parties

The division and allocation of properties between the

as

herein

provided,

including

all

properties,

real,

considered

t o be

i

'personal,

o r mixed,

shall

be made,

deemed,

and

I*
"tax neutral", i.e.

any payment by David Early to Susan Early

lundor this provision is designated as not includible in the gro^u
iincomo Ql Susan Early under Section 71(b)(1)(B) and nor allov/able
ao a deduction to David Early under Section 215 of the Internal
Revcp.ae Code of 1986, -> ; amended.
payment
!Mlli

I

for Federal

d e s i q - \ <-t t i o n .

income

The parties agree to treat tho

tax purposes consistently with this
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3.

The Plaintiff, Susan Early, may be awarded as her

sole and separate real property, the real property identified as
the "family residence" located at 4061 South Powers Circle, Salt
Lake City, Utah, tree

of any lien or claim.

In addition

thereto, the Plaintiff shall receive as her sole and separate
property all of the furniture, furnishings and other personal
property, including Plaintiff's jewelry, personal effects,
clothing, and cash accounts, presently located within said
"family residence", with the exception that Defendant shall
receive the following items as his sole and separate property:
A)

Two oriental rugs identifiable oy the parties.

B)

One bronze Indian statue.

Ao a condition to Defendant taking possession of ihr* said
starue, he shall replace same with a statue represented by
Margaret Amberson in writing to be a reasonable replacement.
4.

The Plaintiff shalJ be awarded the Audi automobile

presently in her possession, free of any liens or. encumbrance:,,
including repair bills previously presented by or to David Errly
Tires, Inc.
5.

The custody of the two minor children which have been

born as issue of this marriage, namely:

DAVID, JR., and PORTIA,

is awarded to the Plaintiff, subject, however, no liberal eights
of visitation by the Defendant.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the parties further
stipulate that in th>2 event the Plaintiff moves from the S* at*

-4-

of Utah during

the time that

the minor

child, David, J&. , is *.

if

at v. e iid-i."fig—l^-e4r-l-a-m^—H-?rl-l— s-c-hxrolr;—tii-e--c-u-s-bady--of •—sueh- mi no 5/^ch i 1 d ^ ^
shall be awarded

to the D e f e n d a n t

QJ

dha-E4Hfr§---s-tfre-h school p e r i o d s ,

<p-r-ov-i-d-ed s ai-d—-m-inor- oh-i-4-d—d^-gireo to refna-i-n on-fuelled in ouch•insti tirtioTT -and-remains--in

6.
support

and

the- S^-t-e--of--H-ba+h.

The Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff for the
maintenance

of

the minor

children of the pai.
;rties

.
thgf

sum of $500 per child per monthAuntil such child attains his or
her respective majority.

In addition thereto, the Defendant

shall pay the private school expenses, including tuition, books,
and other fees as may be incurred by the minor child, David
Early, Jr., while attending RolLand Hall.

Also, the Defendant

agrees to pay all college expenses of said children, including
tuition, books, and living expenses, including housing, food,
clothing, transportation, etc., so long as said child or
children reside away from the family home during such college
education, and provided, further, that such child or children
are fully matriculated and upon the further limitation and
condition that such additional expenses shall be made available
to provide for the procurement of a bachelor's degree or its
equivalent based upon full time matriculation in any such
college.
7.

The Defendant is entitled to claim the dependency

exemptions for the minor children of the parties whenever eitherparty is entitled to claim the dependency exemptions under
Section 152(e) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as

c££
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amended.

Plaintiff agrees to sign and provide to Defendant a

declaration required by the Internal Revenue Service to
implement such claim.
8.

The Defendant agrees to pay all medical and dental

expenses of the minor children of the parties until each attains
their respective majority and thereafter, so long as any such
child or children are fully matriculated in college in
accordance with the provisions set forth hreinabove.
9.

Defendant shall maintain a policy of health insurance

for the benefit of the Plaintiff consistent wi'th that which has
been previously in effect so long as such insurance is available
to the Defendant through his business or employment.

A copy of

sucn policy shall be immediately provided to Plaintiff.
10.

With the exception of those assets and monies

referred to hereinabove, the Defendant shall be awarded as his
sole and separate properties, free and clear of any lien or
claim on the part of the Plaintiff, each and every other atset
owned, acquired, or which either of the parties claim any right,
title or interest therein, whether real, personal/ mixed,
tangible, or intangible, including, but not limited to, the
following:
A)

All stock in and to David Early Ties, Inc., issued

or otherwise, Galeria Des Expositions, Quail Creek
Vineyard, their successors or predecessors, in the name
of the Plaintiff and/or Defendant, or which Plaintiff may
claim any right, title or interest therein.

-5a-

B)

The Defendant shall have and retain as his sole,

individual and sepatate property all of the interests in
certain businesses known as David Early Tires, Inc.,
Galerie Des Expositions, and Quail Creek Vineyard, said
businesses are operated by David W. Early, including
stock and other choses in action, free of any claim or
interest of Plaintiff and Plaintiff agrees to execute any
and all necessary documents and instruments, including
endorsement and delivery of stock, if any, to effect the
intent and purpose of this clause.

Defendant agrees to

indemnify and save Plaintiff harmless on any and all
obligations, claims, and demands against her as a result
of past, present, or future operation of such businesses.
C)

Each and every parcel of real property,

wheresoever an whatsoever, owned by the Plaintiff and/or
Eefendant, or either of them, and in this regard, the
said Plaintiff

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

y'£s
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shall

execute

and

deliver

to

the

Defendant

such

deeds

of

conveyance as may be necessary or appropriate to convey and
relinquish
favor

all of

of

the

her right, title, or interest therein in
said

Defendant.

specifically

represents

assignment,

conveyance,

encumbrance
property,
Defendant
D)
or

against
except

that

she

has

such

parcel

liens

or

executed

said
not

hypothecation,

any

those

The

Plaintiff

executed

lien,

or

parcels
by

any
other

of

real

Plaintiff

and

jointly.

All assets or interests in any and all partnership

partnerships,

corporations,

licenses, stock, and

choses

or description, whatsoever

patents,

in action
owned

trade

names,

ot* any kind,

nature

by the parties, or either

of them, as of the date of tnis Stipulation.
E)

All

persona]

j

possession.

J

11.

pbligations

attendant

property

The Defendant
to

or

and

possessions

now

in

his

shall assume and pay all debts

arising

from

the

assets

which

and

he

is

i

awarded

and

are

protect

the

Plaintiff

business

distributed

identified

as

to

against

him,

any

and

debts

further
and

indemnify

obligations

and

of

"David Early T i r e s , Inc.", its retail

t:\e

stcre

i'

[[Locations, a l l

tax l i a b i l i t i e s ,

i n c l u d i n g s t a t e and f e d e r a l

income

ji
Jtax liabilities of the parties prior to the date of the execntic,l
'of this Stioulation.
Be it provided, however, that with respect :.c

I!
j'any federal,

state, or

local

income

tax

liabilities

arising ^ C I I

!
L WAV | (A P C }

jthe

income

of

Susan

Early

which

has

not

be

disclosed

to

t.>e

liaoilicy

a* :

£ '-in u r ^ u i

iDefendant

shall

be and

remain her

sole and

separate

/O

•7-

paid Plaintiff

shall

indemnify and protect the Defendant against

pny such Liabilities
12i)y
jclebts and

The Plaintiff agrees to assume and pay the separate

obligations

which

she has

incurred

subsequent

to the

Reparation of the parties, excepting those which, by Order of the
Court, Defendant is obligated to pay, and agrees to indemnify and
lold the Defendant harmless therefrom.
13.

The parties have filed, or will file, joint federal

knd state income tax returns for the year 1987 and prior thereto.
jtfith respect

to these

joint

returns, David

Early

has the

sole

i

!

Responsibility for any deficiency or assessment and has the sole
i

right to any refund, carryforward, or carryback.
take any actions he deems

i

necessary

David Early may

to prosecute any refund or

i&efend any deficiency or assessment and will solelv Day all costs

p

[incurred.

Susan

Early

waives

any

right

to

refunds

and

will

ll
•cooperate fully and promptly in these matters, including executing
:i
\\\ power of attorney and any other necessary instruments providing
if

linformation

and

testimony

and

endorsing

any

refund

checks

or

ii
i|
jyouchers.

14.

Each of the parties waives and relinquishes any and

jail right or claim to alimony, effective upon the payment of the
consideration due hereunder.
15.

Certain monies have been advanced by the Defendant for

the account of the Plaintiff to defray certain costs of litigation,
including attorney's fees, appraisal fees, and accountant's fees.
i!

LIAPC)
M LAW
>N HUH. C*NG
Li * *i » M

;ln this regard, the Plaintiff shall have no obligation to account

ji
attorney's
fees shall
incurred
c^ ^-?
Itheir
f or orrespective
repay any costs
such and
funds.
Each party
be horolflfT
responsible
i'or
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16.

Until such time as this Stipulation is executed and

judgment entered thereon, the parties agree to abide by the
prior Orders of this Court,
17.

Concurrent with the execution of the final Decree

and Judgment herein, the parties agree to execute mutual
releases between one another in the form attached hereto
entitled "Mutual Release" and by reference incorporated herein \
and made a part hereof, a x ^
18.

. J e-nf* A f<v

75

f y t u b ' t C W

The parties agree that a Decree of Divorce may be

awarded to each party in accordance with the terms hereof on the
grounds oi

irreconcilable differences.

DATiiD this _[<Z_

.BRANT H . WALL
Attorney for Defendant

day of October, 1988.

ADDENDUM "D"

MUTUAL RELEASE;
DECREE OF DIVORCE

EXHIBIT "C M

11
!

I

\

I
;

MUTUAL RELEASE

i'

!

This

INDENTURE

made

and

executed

this

day

on

:i .
y; •-

vy r v , 1988, by and between SUSAN EARLY and DAVID EARLY.

l|
i

I

j1

W I T N E S S E T H

;

I

li

J

|
|l

WHEREAS, the said parties have been involved in a contested
j

hdivorce action in the District Court of Salt Lake County, State ofi
!i

Utah, identified as Civil Action No. D86-4771; and,

j!
WHEREAS, said parties have, by Stipulation dated the 13tn
!i
j.day of October, 1988, resolved all of their disputes and claims J
i

| and

the same has been or is about to be adjudicated or will be

resolved by formal decree of said Court.
I

NOW, THEREFORE, IN CONSIDERATION of the premises aforesaid;

it

I
II

and subject to the faithful performance of the requirements of said
judgment and decree based upon such Stipulation, the said parties J

I and each of them, do hereby release and forever discharge the other

J

!'

i of,

from,

action,

and

against

obligations,

any

and

damages,

all
and

claims, demands,
liabilities

of

causes ofi

any

nature

whatsoever, whether known or unknown, suspected or claimed, which
'they, and each of them, ever had, now have, or may hereafter hav£
or

claim

including

to

have

against

the

other, whether

known

or

unknownj

specifically, but not exclusively, and without limitin

« the generality of the foregoing, any and all claims and causes o
action, based
relationship

on, or

in any manner

arising

out of the marriage

of the parties, or any other relationship, existing

prior hereto, or in any manner connected therewith.
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In
Release

the

agreement, the

independently
professionals
parties

negotiation, preparation, and

and

parties

represented

by

acknowledge
counsel,

execution

that

each

accountants,

of this
has

and

been
other

in the examination of the marital property of the
all

other

assets

owned,

claimed,

or

jointly oif

severally owned or held by said parties.
The

parties

have

relied

upon

the

independent

counsel J

i'

ljvaluation, and appraisals conducted by the professionals to guide
!

j[the parties in determining the values of the properties and assets]
i

t

and the division thereof.

i.
Both the legal and practical effect of this agreement ixk
I
Meach and every respect and the financial status of the parties has
i
J
been fully explained to both parties by their respective counsel
and they both acknowledge that it is a fair agreement and is not
the result of any fraud, duress, or undue influence exercised by
(I either party upon the other or by any other person or persons upom
I, either, and they further agree that this agreement contains thi
|l entire understanding of the parties.

There are no representations!

i

I

i| promises, warranties, covenants, or undertakings other than thosi
hexpressly set forth therein.

It is mutually understood that this

I agreement is entered into only after considerable negotiation ancjl
''as a result of much thought and deliberation by and on behalf o
1

each of the parties hereto and with the distinct understanding that
it shall be construed as a final settlement between the parties of
all property, alimony, or other financial rights arising out of thi
marital contract or otherwise; and is entered into voluntarily by

(APC)

T LAW
IBUILCXNG ]

f\
[Vj

/
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both parties upon the advice of their respective attorneys afte
open opportunity to examine and appraise full by both Plaintiff an£
Defendant

as

to

all

property

and

property

rights,

owned

controlled, or possessed by them; and, after mature deliberatioh
!

i and having in mind the financial status of each of the parties
I
lihereto and all property owned, controlled, or possessed by them an£
|l
'ieach of them, the foregoing is declared to be a fair, equitable, an£
I just settlement.

It is understood by Plaintiff and Defendant tha

] the facts in respect of which this agreement is made may hereaftet
» prove to be other than or different from the facts now known by
I either of

them or believed by either of them to be true, as se

i| out in this agreement.

Each of the parties expressly accepts an{I

j' assumes the risk of the facts proving to be so different, and each
of the parties agrees that all the terms of this agreement shall bfe
in

all

respects

effective

and

not

subject

to

termination o):

I recission by any such difference in facts.
j'

The parties shall, and do, hereby mutually remise, release

II and

forever

discharge

each

other, the attorney's, accountants

appraisers, and all other professionals employed in this divorc
action from any and all actions, suits, debts, claims, demands, an{i
; obligations whatsoever, whether based upon law, equity, or fraud
'which either of them has ever had, now has, or may hereafter have
against any of the others, upon or by reason of any matter, cause
, or thing up to the date of the execution of the Stipulation fo|r
divorce
L 4 WALL (A PC)
I
ORNEYS AT LAW
',
» BOSTON BUILDING | j
AKECITY UT 04111

settlement

and

the

execution

of

this

Mutual

Release

h including, but not limited to, omissions, comissions, breach o|£

aoi) S210220

i'
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j contract,

tort,

negligent

misrepresentation,

fraudulent

!

, representation, breach of trust or fiduciary duty, or any other
,;matter founded upon equitable relief.

The Plaintiff and Defendant

i

I

• specifically
1

recognize

that the Defendant, David W. Early, may

elect to expand, lease, sell, or otherwise alter or change thA

,'nature of the operation, ownership, or corporate structure of David
• Early Tires, I n c w and that the Plaintiff specifically releases and
I discharges said Defendant from any and all causes of action or
l other claims which may exist or hereafter exist by reason of any

!.

1

!l

such matters.

It is the intention of the parties that hence forth

»1

I
there

shall

be as

between

them only

such

obligations as are specifically provided
Property

Settlement

Agreement

explicit

rights and

in the Stipulation and

hereinabove

identified

and

th$

judgment which issues pursuant thereto.
Further, Plaintiff,

David

Early

Tires, Inc., and

al

predecessors of same, their legal representatives, professionals
successors,
1

and

assignees

mutually

release

and

discharge

on4

another from any and all claims, demands, actions, or suits at law

L

j or in equity of any kind or nature, in any manner arising out of
,all prior relationships, the divorce negotiations, litigation, anp

,i
j;matters referred to in the Stipulation for settlement.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto affixed thei
respective signatures the day and year first hereinabove written.

STTSAN EARLY
L(APC)
AT LAW
ON BUILDING
Y UT 84111
•220

|
I

DAVID^BARLY

~^*^
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RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq., #0492
STEPHEN B. MITCHELL, Esq., #2278
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
Attorneys for Plaintiff
139 East South Temple, #2001
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 355-6677
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SUSAN EARLY,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. D86-04771
Richard H. Moffat, Judge

DAVID WARREN EARLY,
Defendant.

The above entitled matter, having come on for trial
August 8, 9, 10 and 11, 1988, before the Honorable Richard H.
Moffat, Judge of the above-entitled court, and having come
before the Court for hearing on October 20, 1988, Plaintiff
appearing m

person and by and through her attorney of record,

Richard D. Burbidge of Burbidge & Mitchell, and Defendant
appearing in person and by and through his counsel of record,
Brant H. Wall of Wall & Wall, and the Court having received the
Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement entered into
between the parties, and being fully advised in the premises,
now makes and enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff and Defendant have been residing in Salt

Lake county, State of Utah, for three months immediately prior
to the filing of this action.

2.

The parties are husband and wife, having been married

to one another on January 28, 1967, in Burley, Idaho.
3.

The parties have two children as issue of this

marriage, to wit:

Portia Allison Early, born June 29, 1971, and

David Dan Early, born March 31, 1974.
4.

The parties have encountered irreconcilable

differences in their marriage which has caused them to determine
to divorce one another, based upon said irreconcilable
differences within the meaning of Utah Code Annotated, Section
30-3-1.
5.

The parties have entered into a Stipulation and

Property Settlement Agreement dated October 13, 1988, which sets
forth the complete and appropriate division and distribution of
their properties, both real and personal, the appropriate
support obligations as between the parties and as respects their
$y\<L Mutual

children.

Q*U?1>/

The Stipulation and Property Settlement AgreementAis

herein incorporated into the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and attached hereto as Exhibit* A".J-VA.d
6.

^ythiptT

Q

Said Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement

should be approved, should bind the parties and should determine
the division and distribution of the parties1 property, both
real and personal, and the appropriate support obligations as
between the parties, and the care and support of the children of
the parties.
7.

The custody of the two minor children, namely:

Portia Allison and David Dan, is awarded to the Plaintiff, in
accordance with and subject to the terms of the Stipulation and

Property Settlement Agreement dated October 13, 1988.
8.

The parties agree that upon entry of the Decree of

Divorce; the file in the above-referenced matter shall be sealed
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-3-4.
9.

From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now

makes and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
That the Plaintiff and Defendant are entitled to a Decree
of Divorce against one another dissolving the bonds of matrimony
heretofore existing, the same to be final upon entry thereof,
and the same to further provide for the distribution of the real
and personal property of the parties and the support obligations
as between them and as respects the children of the parties as
set forth in the Findings of Facts heretofore answered herein.
Further, the file in this matter shall be sealed in
accordance with Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-3-4.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Judgment be entered
accordingly.
DATED this

day of October, 1988.
BY THE COURT
By
RICHARD H. MOFFAT, Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

RICHARD^r^TRBlSSE
Attorneys for Plaintiff

WALL & WALL

"By

Vj>-*-*.£#

BRAjtfT H .

WALL

A t t o r n e y s for

L^^V^/
Defendant
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RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq-, #0492
STEPHEN B. MITCHELL, Esq., #2278
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
Attorneys for Plaintiff
139 East South Temple, #2001
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 355-6677
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SUSAN EARLY,
Plaintiff,
vs .

DECREE OF DIVORCE
Civil No. D86-04771
RICHARD H. MOFFAT, Judge

DAVID WARREN EARLY,
Defendant.
The above-entitled matter, having come on for trial on
August 8, 9, 10 and 11, 1988, before the Honorable Richard H.
Moffat, Judge of the above-entitled court, and having come
before the Court for hearing on October 20, 1988, Plaintiff
appearing in person and by and through her attorney of record,
Richard D. Burbidge of Burbidge & Mitchell, and Defendant
appearing in person and by and through his counsel of record,
Brant H. Wall of Wall and Wall, and the Court having received a
Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement previously
executed by Plaintiff and Defendant and their counsel of record,
and after being fully advised in the premises, and having made
<:>-' ^nt-f>-ed into its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED as follows, to wit:

1.

That Plaintiff Susan Early and Defendant David Warren

Early be, and hereby are, awarded a divorce from one another
dissolving the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between
the parties, the same to be final upon signing and entry hereof.
2.

The Defendant, David W. Early, shall pay to the

Plaintiff, Susan Early, the sum of $1,250,000.00 as follows:
a.

$1,000,000.00 in cash upon entry of this Decree;

b.

$250,000.00 shall be paid to the Plaintiff by

and

the Defendant in the form of a promissory note, the form
of said promissory note is attached as Exhibit "A11 to the
Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement, bearing
interest at a rate of 10% per annum, such note to be
amortized and in equal monthly installments for a period
of five (5) years, and secured by a first deed of trust,
in the form of Exhibit "B" to the Stipulation and
Property Settlement Agreement, on certain real property
generally identified as David Early Tire Store, No. 2,
located at approximately 253 West 9000 South, Salt Lake
County, State of Utah.

Said note and deed of trust shall

be executed and delivered concurrent with the payment of
the $1,000,000.00 afo:esaid.
3.

The division and allocation of the properties between

the parties as herein provided, including all properties, real,
personal or mixed, shall be made, deemed and considered to be
"tax neutral", i.e., any payment by David Early to Susan Early
under this provision is designated as not includeable in the
gross income of Susan Early under Section 71(b)(1)(B) and not
-2-

allowable as a deduction to David Early under Section 215 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.

The parties agree to

treat the payment for Federal Income Tax purposes consistently
with this designation.
4.

The Plaintiff, Susan Early, shall be awarded as her

sole and separate real property, the real property identified as
the "family residence" located at 4061 South Powers Circle, Salt
Lake City, Utah, free of any lien or claim.

In addition

thereto, the Plaintiff shall receive as her sole and separate
property, all of the furniture, furnishings and other personal
property, including Plaintiff's jewelry, personal effects,
clothing and cash accounts, presently located within said
"family residence", with the exception that Defendant shall
receive the following items as his sole and separate property:
a.

two oriental rugs identifiable by the parties;

and
b.

one bronze Indian statute.

As a condition to

Defendant taking possession of the said statute, he shall
replace same with a statute by Ursula Broadaf Craig,
similar to such statutes offered for sale at Galeria des
Expositions.
5.

The Plaintiff shall be awarded the Audi automobile

presently in her possession, free of any liens or encumbrances,
including repair bills previously presented by or to David Early
Tires, Inc.
6.

The parties have two children as issue of this

marriage, to wit:

Portia Allison, born June 29, 1971, and David

Dan Early, born March 3 1 , 1974.

The custody of the said two

minor children is awarded to the Plaintiff, subject however, to
liberal rights of visitation by the Defendant.

In the event th

Plaintiff moves from the state of Utah during the time that the

cminor cnild, David Dan is *a^t^H^4-ft^~Raw4^-n4-^^l-i^re-h^ei
,,-fche

I

r^4j^^rO-dy—o-f—si^eh- minor./\child shall be awarded to the Defendant*

L

-dtH?-artTcr~strch—s-ch-Q^^--^et4^^-r^pr-ov±^ed---s-^-l"d mintu clrild deoirco to
j^ewa-i-n enir-ei-lad —in —su<2-h- i-ns-t-it-u-t-ton—s.n-d—r-eflva-i-n-3 in Llie &rlale- of **^~^
•tHr«rtr.
7.

The Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff for the

support and maintenance of the minor children of the parties the
sum of $500.00 per child per montfy\until such child attains his
or her respective majority.

In addition thereto, the Defendant

shall pay the private school expenses, including tuition, books,
and other fees as may be incurred by the minor child, David Dan,
while attending Rowland Hall.

The Defendant shall further pay

all college expenses of said children, including tuition, books
and living expenses, 'including housing, food, clothing,
transportation, etc., so long as said child or children reside
away from the family home during such college education, and
provided, further, that such child or children are fully
matriculated and upon the further limitation and condition that
such additional expenses shall be made available to provide for
the procurement of a bachelor's degree or its equivalent, based
U^Ull

i U l *

8.
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The Defendant shall be entitled to claim dependency

exemptions for the minor children of the parties whenever either

_A-

T

party is entitled to claim the dependency exemptions under
Section 152(e) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended.

Plaintiff shall sign and provide to Defendant a

Declaration required by the Internal Revenue Service to
implement such claim,
9.

The Defendant shall pay all medical and dental

expenses of the minor children of the parties until each attains
their respective majority, and thereafter, so long as any such
child or children are fully matriculated in college in
accordance with the provisions set forth hereinabove.
10.

The Defendant shall maintain a policy of health

insurance for the benefit of the Plaintiff consistent with that
which has been previously in effect so long as such insurance is
availaole to the Defendant through his business or employment.
A copy of such policy shall be immediately provided to Plaintiff,
11.

With the exception of those assets and monies

referred to hereinabove, the Defendant shall be awarded as his
sole and separate properties, free and clear of any lien or
claim on the part of Plaintiff, each and every other asset
owned, acquired, or which either of the parties claim any right,
title or interest therein, whether real, personal, mixed,
tangible or intangible, including, but not limited to, the
following:
a.

all stock in and to David Early Tires, Inc.,

issuea or ocnei.wj.be, beueua utb cxpuoi uionb, yuail Creek
Vmyard, their successors or predecessors, in the name of
the Plaintiff and/or Defendant, or which Plaintiff may
claim any right, title or interest therein.

b.

the Defendant shall have and retain as his sole,

individual and separate property all of the interests in
certain businesses known as David Early Tires, Inc.,
Galeria des Expositions and Quail Creek Vinyard.

Said

businesses are operated by David w. Early, including
stock and other choses in action, free of any claim or
interest of Plaintiff, and Plaintiff shall execute any
and all necessary documents and instruments, including
endorsement and delivery of stock, if any, to effect the
intent and purpose of this clause.

Defendant shall

indemnify and save Plaintiff harmless on any and all
obligations, claims, and demands against her as a result
of past, present or future operation of such businesses.
c.

Each and every

parcel of real property,

wheresoever and whatsoever owned by the Plaintiff and/or
Defendant, or either of them, and in this regard, the
said Plaintiff shall execute and deliver to the Defendant
such deeds of conveyance as may be necessary or
appropriate to convey and relinquish all of her right,
title or interest therein in favor of the said
Defendant.

The Plaintiff specifically represents that

she has not executed any assignment, conveyance,
hypothecation, lien, or other encumbrance against any
such parcel or parcels of real property, except those
liens executed by Plaintiff and Defendant jointly.

-fi-

d.

All assets or interests in any and all

partnership or partnerships, corporations, patents, trade
names, licenses, stock and choses in action of any kind,
nature or description, whatsoever owned by the parties,
or either of them, as of the date of this Stipulation.
e.

All personal property and possessions now in his

possession.
12.

Defendant shall assume and pay all debts and

obligations attendant to or arising from the assets which he is
awarded and are distributed to him, and shall further indemnify
and protect the Plaintiff against any debts and obligations of
the business identified as "David Early Tires, Inc.," its retail
store locations, all tax liabilities, including state and
federal income tax liabilities of the parties prior to the date
of the execution of this stipulation.

Be it provided, however,

that with respect to any federal, state or local income tax
liabilities arising from the income of Susan Early which has not
been disclosed to the Defendant shall be and remain her sole and
separate liability, and said Plaintiff shall indemnify and
protect the Defendant against any such liabilities.
13.

The Plaintiff shall assume and pay the separate

debts and obligations which she has incurred subsequent to the
separation of the parties, excepting those which, by previous
order of the Court, Defendant is obliged to pay, and shall
indemnify and hold the Defendant harmless therefrom.
14.

The parties shall file joint federal and state

income tax returns for the year 1987 and prior thereto.

With

respect to said joint returns, David Early shall have the sole
responsibility for any deficiency or assessment and shall have
the sole right to any refund, carry forward or carry back.
David Early shall take any actions he deems necessary to
prosecute any refund or defend any deficiency or assessment and
shall solely pay all costs incurred.

Susan Early shall waive

any right to refunds and shall cooperate fully and promptly in
these matters, including executing a power of attorney and any
other necessary instruments, providing information and testimony
and endorsing any refund checks or vouchers.
15.

Each of the parties waives and relinquishes any and

all right or claim to alimony.
16.

Certain monies have been advanced by the Defendant

for the account of the Plaintiff to defray certain costs of
litigation, including attorneys1 fees, appraisal fees and
accountants1 fees.

In this regard, the Plaintiff shall have no

obligation to account for or repay any such funds.

Each party

shall be responsible for their respective costs and attorneys1
fees incurred herein.
17.

Concurrent with the execution of this final Decree

of Divorce and Judgment herein, the parties shall execute mutual
releases between one another.
DATED this

day of October, 1988.
BY THE COURT
By
RICHARD H. MOFFAT, Judge

_ Q _

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
BURBIDGE/X MLTCI
RICHARD D. ^ORSlp^E
Attorneys f oo-Plaintif f
WALL & WALL
BY.

BRANT H. WALL-€ttorneys for Defendant

dd0209a
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ADDENDUM "E"

PLAINTIFF'S AFFIDAVIT

RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq., #0492
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
Attorneys for Plaintiff
139 East South Temple, Suite 2001
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
(801) 355-6677

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SUSAN EARLY,

i
)
)

Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF SUSAN EARLY
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
ORDER OF CONTEMPT AND JUDGMEN'

vs.
1
]1

DAVID WARREN EARLY,
Defendants.

Civil No. D86-04771
Richard H. Moffat, Judge

]

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

ss.

I, SUSAN EARLY, being first duly sworn do say:

1.

I am the Plaintiff in the above-referenced action.

2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A are true and correct

copies of expenses incurred at the parties' home located at 4061
Powers Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah.

All expenses as outlined

below have been pro rated as of October 27, 1988; the date of
execution of the Stipulation and Property

Settlement

entered into in the above-referenced matter.

Agreement

Expenses incurred

which are subject to the court's order include:
a.

Utah Power and Light bill covering services from

September 21, 1988, to October 21, 1988 in the amount of $413.05;

b.

Mountain Fuel bill covering expenses incurred from

October 3, 1988 through November, 1, 1988, totalling $553.22.

A

prorated amount due is $461.00;
c.

U.S. West bill for services from October 7, 1988,

through November 6, 1988, totalling $173.09.

The prorated amount

due is $117.18; and
d.

County Treasurer bill for general property taxes on

the residence

from January

totalling $3,923.14.
3.

1, 1988 through

December

31, 1988,

The prorated amount due is $3,325.00;

There remains due and owing a total of $495.85 for

expenses incurred from July through October on the 1984 Audi.
4.

Defendant was ordered by this court to provided

$3,000.00 per month for temporary alimony and child support.
remains

due

and

owing

the

sum

of

There

$2,612.79, representing

the

prorated amount of alimony and child suppport for the month of
October.
5.

As outlined herein, Defendant is indebted in the

amount of $7,424.87, .this amount remains due and owing.
DATED this

UP ^

day of February, 1989.

SUSAN EARLY
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this Q7^
February, 1989.

A

<"*•"• <*> #•>
ddEarly.Aff

day of
»

totV*£kfc
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ADDENDUM "Fn

DEFENDANT'S AFFIDAVIT

BRANT H. WALL, NO. 3 364
I [WALL & WALL, a.p.c.
|Attorney for Defendant
.Suite 800 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
[Telephone: (801) 521-8220
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY |
STATE OF UTAH
SUSAN H. EARLY,

|

Plaintiff,
:

AFFIDAVIT OF
DAVID W. EARLY

:

Civil No. D86-4771

:

HONORABLE RICHARD H. MOFFAT

|

vs.
|
j

DAVID W. EARLY,
Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH

)
:
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)

ss.

DAVID W. EARLY, being first duly sworn upon oath/ deposes
and states as follows:
1.

That

he

is the Defendant

identified

in the abov£

entitled action and familiar with the matters hereinafter set fort
and contained.
2.
(Plaintiff

That on or about December
submitted

r

I

to

counsel

for

9, 1988, counsel for thfe
the

Defendant

a

letter

I requesting payment of various sums and amounts which the Plaintiff
i

contended to be due and owing by virtue of the prior Orders anci
1

I

( rulings

1

of this Court. A copy of said letter is attached hereto ,
| for identification purposes marked Exhibit "A", and by reference
i

L & WALL {A PC)
ORNEYS AT LAW
» BOSTON BUILDING
AKE CITY UT 84111
801) S21 8220

I made a part hereof.
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3.

That in response thereto, Defendant, by and through hii

counsel, submitted

a response

letter, together with supporting

receipts, under date of January 4, 1989.

A copy of said letter is

attached hereto, for identification purposes marked Exhibit

M lf

B |

and by reference made a part hereof.
4.

That Affiant has made an analysis of the sums claimed

by the Plaintiff herein and has further investigated the nature and
extent of each assertion and believes that the letter of January 4 1
1989, fairly and accurately sets forth a summary of the Defendant's
position relative to the various sums claimed to be due and owin$
by the Plaintiff.
5.

The obligations

in favor of Utah Power and Light

II Company, Mountain Fuel, and U.S. West as described in Paragraph
2(a), (b), and (c) of Plaintiff1 s Affidavit, are obligations which
Defendant concedes are appropriate charges and obligations of the
Defendant.
6.
Divorce

on

That prior to the entry of the Judgment and Decree o£
or

about

October

payments as were necessary
awarded

28, 1988, Affiant

had made such

to protect the residential property

to the Plaintiff; that said mortgage payments did no

require a payment for "tax and insurance payments11, and the taxe&
which ultimately became due and payable on the residential dwelling
awarded to the Plaintiff became due and payable on November 30
1988.
7.
the
ALL (A P C )
rS AT LAW
HON BUILOtNG
ITY UTB4U1
216220

That no tax or insurance payments were required under

existing

mortgage

awarded to the Plaintiff.

pertaining

to

the

residential

property

-3-

8.

That the item of $495.85 for expenses incurred on th4

Audi automobile have been approved as an appropriate obligation of
the Defendant as outlined in Defendant's response by his counsel to
counsel

for

the

Plaintiff

under

letter dated January

4, 198?

(Exhibit "B").
9.

That Defendant has acknowledged the sum of $2,612.79 a^

an appropriate obligation of the Defendant for child support an
alimony for the prorated portion of the month of October, 1988, an
has so advised the Plaintiff (see Exhibit M B " ) .
10.

That the Stipulation of the parties dated October 13 ,j

1988, which was submitted as the basis for the Judgment entere

1

herein contains a provision under Paragraph 12 that the Plaintiff

agrees to assume and pay the separate debts and obligations which
she has incurred subsequent to the separation of the parties]
except those which by Order of the Court the Defendant is obligated
to pay.

j
11.

That the parties separated on or about October 13 J

1986, and since that date and prior to the entry of the Decree off
Divorce, the said Defendant received and and has caused to be paid
for

the

benefit

of

the

Plaintiff

the

following

debts

and

obligations incurred by the Plaintiff, which Affiant claims and
contends constitute personal debts and obligations of the Plaintiff
which she was obligated to pay and discharge pursuant to the prior
Orders of this Court and the Stipulation of the parties:
A)

A bill to Domus in the sum of $800 for personal items

purchase from the boutique.
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B)

A bill to R. C. Willey in the sum of $475.82 for

furniture for Plaintiff's residence.
C)

A bill to Pool Professionals in the sum of $89.69 for I

servicing the pool at Plaintiff's residence.
D)

A bill to Palmer Wholesale in the sum of $321.85 for

plants and/or flowers.
E) ' Bills to ZCMI in the total amount of $4,619.15 for
personal items and clothing.
F)

Bills to Zions in the total amount of 551.66 for

Plaintiff's revolving charge account.
G)

A bill to Bonneville Heat in the sum of $44.50 for the

heater repair at Plaintiff's residence.
H)

A bill to Blooming Sales in the sum of $347.02 for

flowers and/or plants.
I)

Bills to The Cottonwood Club in the total amount of

$1,446.39 for Plaintiff's membership dues and accompanying
charges.
J)

A bill to Jerry Coleman in the sum of $4/319.19, who I

was a painter hired by Plaintiff to paint Plaintiff's
residence.
* K)

A bill to Stevens & Brown in the sum of $1,430.51 for

personal sporting goods and equipment for Plaintiff.
12.
has paid

for

That by reason of the foregoing, the said Defendant
the use and

benefit

of

the Plaintiff

a total oJ£

$15,444.71, which were and are obligations which the Plaintiff wajs
obliged and obligated to pay by virtue of the prior rulings of thip
Court and the Stipulation and Judgment entered herein.
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13.

That after allowing the Plaintiff a credit as se

forth hereinabove, there remains

the sum of $11,344,84, which

Affiant contends to be a credit and sum due and owing to him by th£
Plaintiff based upon the prior Orders of this Court and Stipulation
of the parties as aforesaid.
14.

Further Affiant saith naught.

DATED this 2T1

day of February, 1989.

k\AA\,WW^II^

DAVID W. EARLY

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

-0~)^'^

day o

February, 1989.

/ . • • > / YUJu.A
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J^AR^f PUBLIC
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